The International Monetary System and the Erosion of Sovereignty: Essay in Honor of Cynthia Lichtenstein by Lowenfeld, Andreas F
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 2 Symposium: Globalization & the Erosion of
Sovereignty in Honor of Professor Lichtenstein
Article 6
5-1-2002
The International Monetary System and the
Erosion of Sovereignty: Essay in Honor of Cynthia
Lichtenstein
Andreas F. Lowenfeld
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Banking and Finance Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston
College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The International Monetary System and the Erosion of Sovereignty: Essay in
Honor of Cynthia Lichtenstein, 25 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 257 (2002),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol25/iss2/6
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 
AND THE EROSION OF SOVEREIGNTY: 
ESSAY IN HONOR OF CYNTHIA 
liCHTENSTEIN 
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD* 
Abstract: When the major international organizations were established 
at the close of World War II, it was understood that they were concerned 
with international relations-political, economic, and social. As was 
made explicit in the U.N. Charter, but applicable in all the 
organizations, matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state" were not the concern of the international organizations or 
the international community. In particular, the International Monetary 
Fund was to focus on member states' balance of payments, exchange 
rates, and exchange controls, but not on their domestic policies or 
priorities. Gradually, it became clear that the wall between domestic and 
international policies could not be maintained. As the IMF moved to a 
regime of conditionality for the use of its resources, and thereafter to 
performance targets and deadlines, domestic policies of states became 
subjects of examination in ever increasing detail. Not only national 
budgets, taxes, and the money supply, but subsidies, wage policies, 
competition law, corporate governance, even accounting practices and 
regulatory reform became subject to scrutiny, negotiation and 
commitment. The Essay does not condemn this erosion of sovereignty, 
but points out that neither the member states nor the IMF have come 
up with a new theory to reflect the new reality, or reached agreement 
on where a new boundary may be set between national and 
international concerns. 
INTRODUCTION 
I am very pleased to be able to participate in a tribute to Cynthia 
Lichtenstein. She is not only a friend of many years standing, but she 
was an intellectual bridge for me when I needed one. 
When I became interested in the international monetary system 
as a young lawyer in the State Department, I did not receive a warm 
* Herbert and Rose Rubin Professor of International Law, New York University School 
of Law. 
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welcome. International monetary affairs were for Treasury, not State, 
and anyway not for lawyers, except for a few bank lawyers on Wall 
Street or at the Federal Reserve, who spoke only to one another. I 
thought that was wrong, but I have to say that in five and a half years 
in the Legal Adviser's office at the State Department, in which I par-
ticipated in matters concerning trade, economic sanctions, shipping, 
aviation, foreign investment-virtually the complete range of interna-
tional economic interests of the United States government, I never 
had the opportunity to become involved in issues of the international 
monetary system. 
When I left government service and began on the project with 
Abram Chayes and Thomas Ehrlich to prepare a new kind of interna-
tional law case book, I insisted on a chapter on the international 
monetary system, even though we had to learn as we went along.l And 
there was Professor Lichtenstein, with true credentials as a Wall Street 
lawyer, but also academic interests, and firm in her conviction that 
financial affairs are part of international affairs and that monetary law 
is a significant component of international law. 
Later, when the chapter in the Chayes, Ehrlich, and Lowenfeld 
book grew into a volume of its own in my series on international eco-
nomic law, I was very pleased that Professor Lichtenstein, by now a 
professor, gave it a nice review, both on substance and as a teaching 
tool.2 
I. 
I was interested from the beginning in the concept of condition-
ality-that is what could be asked by the International Monetary Fund 
prior to making its resources available to a potential borrower. Some 
people, including Lord Keynes, thought no questions should be asked 
at all. If I go to Bloomingdale's and express an interest in an expen-
sive carpet, I do not have to explain why I want the carpet, whether I 
can truly afford it, whether the money would not better be used to 
pay my children's tuition, or whether it will fit in my house. If I go to 
the perfume counter, I will not be asked whether I am looking for a 
gift for my wife, for a girlfriend, or for some actress whose eye I would 
1 See ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH, ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LE-
GAL PROCESS ch. 10 (1968-69). 
2 Cynthia Lichtenstein, Preparing Students for Practice in International Law: On Teaching 
the Law of International Transactions: International Economic Law, 80 AM. J. lNT'L L. 722, 727 
(1986) (book review). 
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like to catch. At most, the credit card company-Visa, Master Card, or 
American Express-will check whether the purchase comes within my 
allowed credit, and whether I am current on my minimum monthly 
payment. Keynes thought that the same should apply to countries 
drawing on the Fund, i.e., purchasing dollars or other convertible 
currencies with their own currencies. He wrote, "if countries are to be 
given sufficient confidence, they must be able to rely in all normal 
circumstances on drawing a substantial part of their quota without 
policing or facing unforeseen obstacles."3 In contrast, the United 
States' position was that, "discretion on the part of the Fund was es-
sential if the Fund's resources were to be conserved for the purposes 
for which the Fund was established and if the Fund were to be 
influential in promoting what it considers to be appropriate financial 
policies. "4 
Both views could be supported by the text of the Articles of 
Agreement of the IMF as they emerged from the Bretton Woods con-
ference.5 Article V(3) provides: "A member shall be entitled to buy 
the currency of another member ... [if it] represents that [the cur-
rency] is presently needed for making in that currency payments 
which are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." Such a 
statement seemed to support Keynes. But according to Article V(5), 
the Fund could limit or deny access to the Fund's resources if it was 
"of the opinion that the member is using the resources ... in a man-
ner contrary to the purposes of the Fund .... " 
What did that mean? 
In their first interpretation in 1946, on request of the United 
States, the Executive Directors said authority to use the resources of 
the Fund is "limited to use in accordance with its purposes to give 
temporary assistance in financing balance of payments deficits on 
current account for monetary stabilization purposes. "6 That was not 
very illuminating, but at least it suggested that requests for drawings 
were subject to some scrutiny. Then the question arose how to under-
stand the phrase "the member ... represents .... " in Article V(3). Did 
the Fund have to take the member's word that it needed the Fund's 
3 Letter from Lord Keynes to Prof. Jacob Viner ( Oct. 1, 1943), quoted in HoRSEFIELD & 
DE VRIES ET AL., 1 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-65, at 72 (1969). 
4 RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 113 (3d ed. 1980). 
5 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 
1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. 
6 Ex. Bd. Decision No. 71-2 (Sept. 26, 1946), in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MONETARY FuND 128 (25th Issue 2000) [hereinafter SELECTED DECISIONS]. 
260 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 25:257 
resources for a purpose consistent with the Agreement? Or could an 
independent examination be undertaken to see whether the repre-
sentation was correct? 
In 1948, the Executive Directors said that if the member applying 
to use the Fund's resources made the representation set out in Article 
V(3), it had fulfilled the requirement. But, the decision went on to 
provide that the Fund may, "for good reasons," challenge the correct-
ness of the member's declaration on the grounds that the currency is 
not "presently needed," or because the currency is not needed for 
payment "in that currency," or because the payments will not be "con-
sistent with the provisions of this Agreement. "7 
Again, what did this mean? 
Four years later, the Managing Director stated, "a body of particu-
lar criteria will have to be built up," but even at the outset, "it must be 
clear that access to the Fund should not be denied because a member 
is in difficulty."8 The Fund's attitude should turn on "whether the 
problem to be met is of a temporary nature and whether the policies 
the member will pursue will be adequate to overcome the problem 
within such a period." 
I understood-perhaps misunderstood-this to mean that if the 
member's problem did not fit this standard, that is if the problem 
could not be met within a period of one to three years, then the issue 
was one of "fundamental disequilibrium" (an undefined term in the 
Articles of Agreement), and the member might be authorized-in the 
age of fixed exchange rates-to devalue its currency. Still, when the 
Managing Director said "[t]he policies, above all, should determine 
the Fund's attitude," the question remained-what policies? 
My perception was that there was a kind of jurisdictional barrier 
between the international organization and sovereign states that 
could not be breached, even in the context of extending financial as-
sistance. Thus, for instance, the Fund might say to a government, you 
must keep your budgetary deficit to within five percent of your Gross 
National Product (GNP); but the Fund could not decide or even ad-
vise on whether this prescription would be carried out through a re-
duction in veterans' benefits, farm subsidies, or road building. The 
Fund could not prescribe, much less condition aid upon, say, privatiz-
ing electric power production or opening telecommunications up to 
7 Ex. Bd. Decision No. 284-4 (Mar. 10, 1948), in SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 6, at 
129. 
8 Ex. Bd. Decision No. 102-(52/11) (Feb. 13, 1952), in SELECTED DECISIONS, supra 
note 6, at 130. 
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foreign investment. All of these matters were "essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the member state"-to borrow from the text 
of the U.N. Charter-and were not appropriate for inquiry, advice, or 
command by the IMF. 
II. 
Gradually, the understanding-a truism today-hit home that a 
state's domestic economic policies could not be separated from its 
international economic policies, including the balance of payments 
and the value of its currency. A striking example came in connection 
with the devaluation of the British pound in 1967. Britain, which had 
been "living off tick," in the language of the London streets; that is, by 
financing its deficits rather than undertaking fundamental reforms, 
found that its credit was exhausted, and that only a substantial de-
valuation of the pound would open up the opportunity for new bor-
rowing, including for the first time, drawing under the General Ar-
rangements to Borrow. The conditions for the drawing, as had 
become standard practice, would be contained in a Letter of Intent, 
nominally a letter from the Finance Minister or comparable official to 
the Managing Director of the Fund, but in fact a negotiated docu-
ment. In those days, the Fund was more committed to confidentiality 
than it is today, and it did not make the conditions public. However, 
political pressure forced the British government to publish its Letter 
of Intent, for Parliament, and all the world, to see what commitments 
the government had had to make to obtain its loan.9 
"My Dear Mr. Schweitzer," Jim Callaghan, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer wrote to the IMF's Managing Director, "it will be the Gov-
ernment's intention to maintain the policy under which there is no 
entitlement to a 'norm' or standard increase in pay ... and there is 
no criterion for pay increases related to changes in the cost of liv-
ing."lO The government pledged not to borrow, i.e., from domestic 
sources, more than £1 billion; it would abolish all remaining ex-
change controls on current transactions as soon as possible; and it 
would be "happy to consult" with the Managing Director on the re-
sults of its devaluation and accompanying measures within three 
months and twice more in the coming year, as well as whenever the 
9 Letter of Intent of November 23, 1967, 755 Pari. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) (1967) 648-65, 
reprinted in ANDREAS LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 65-67 (2d ed. 
1984). 
10 !d. 
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Managing Director thought it was appropriate, as long as Britain re-
mained a substantial debtor to the Fund.ll 
One could not quite say the jurisdictional barrier had crum-
bled-at least not without knowing what went on in the consultations 
to which Britain had committed itself. For instance, would the Fund 
tell, or urge, the British government to rescind the policy under 
which prescriptions under the National Health Service were free? Or 
how many troops Britain should maintain in Germany? But at least 
there was a breach in the barrier-an acknowledgment, if not an ar-
ticulation, that countries were subject not only to the forces of nature, 
the laws of economics, but to a considerable extent to the judgments 
of the international community, represented not by the gnomes of 
Zurich but by the International Monetary Fund. 
III. 
By the mid-1970s, the IMF had survived the collapse of the fixed 
exchange rate system, and though the code of conduct for member 
states was now much weaker,I2 certainly for states that did not draw on 
its resources, the Fund retained its role as the one institution that 
could tell countries what to do without provoking major political, bi-
lateral storms. It would not be appropriate, for instance, for the 
United States to tell Brazil, Mexico, or the Philippines to reduce their 
domestic subsidies or collect taxes more effectively. But the IMF could 
do so. 
When the Articles of Agreement were amended at Jamaica in 
1976, essentially to recognize the demise of the par value system and 
to banish the no-longer stabilizing role of gold, Article V(3) was 
amended to at least confirm that the Fund could, and indeed should, 
place conditions on requests for drawings. Only requests for "reserve 
tranche purposes," i.e., for the member states' own gold or hard cur-
rency contributions, were not to be subject to challenge.13 Even as the 
conditions for drawings or stand-by arrangements became more 
refined, with phased drawings and performance criteria, the implied 
jurisdictional barrier was maintained. In 1979, the Executive Directors 
11 /d. To be precise, as long as Fund holdings of sterling exceeded 125% of Britain's 
quota. ld. 
12 See Amended Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Apr. 30, 
1976, art. IV, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.IA.S. No. 8927 [hereinafter Amended Articles of Agree-
ment] (concerning Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements). 
1s Id. arts. V(3) (a), (c). 
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issued Guidelines on Conditionality14 calling for phasing and per-
formance clauses beyond the first credit tranche, but stated, 
"(p]erformance criteria will normally be confined to (i) macroeco-
nomic variables, and (ii) those necessary to implement specific provi-
sions of the [Articles of Agreement] or policies adopted under them. 
Performance criteria may relate to other variables only in exceptional 
cases .... "15 
By the end of the 1970s, two things had become clear-at least to 
those who paid careful attention. First, the clients of the Fund, that is 
the countries that sought to draw on the Fund's resources, were now 
entirely developing countries, so that the issue of focus essentially be-
came a North-South issue, until the 1990s, when Russia and some of 
the other states that once made up the Second World, became mem-
bers of the Fund and then clients.16 
Second, a number of countries, particularly in Latin America, 
had figured out how to get around the intrusiveness of the IMF, which 
was threatening even if the new performance criteria were limited to 
macroeconomic variables. The m~or money-center banks (and some 
not so major banks as well) were flush with the deposits from the 
newly rich oil producers for which they had agreed to pay high inter-
est rates, and they were only too glad to re-lend these funds to devel-
oping countries, with no questions (or at least not many questions) 
asked-certainly not questions about internal policies. 
Shortly after the beginning of the next decade, the first crisis of a 
developing country debt broke out, set off by Mexico's announce-
ment in August, 1982 that it could not make the payments due on its 
external debt, followed not very long thereafter by Brazil, Venezuela, 
Argentina, and others. The causes of the defaults-carelessness by the 
lender banks, recklessness by the borrowing states, shifts in interest 
rates to the detriment of the borrowers, inadequacy of the surveil-
lance supposed to be undertaken by the IMF-are outside the topic of 
this essay. What brings me back to my topic is that at this point private 
lenders were no longer available as an alternative to the IMF and 
those who relied on the IMF to set the conditions. A massive rescue 
effort was arranged by the United States, the Group of Ten countries, 
14 Ex. Bd. Decision No. 6056-(79/38) (Mar. 2, 1979), in SELECTED DECISIONS, supra 
note 6, at 228. 
15 !d., 8. 
16 See MARGARET GARRETSON DE VRIES, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1972-
1978, at 23-24 (1985). Italy was the last "First World" country to draw on the Fund, in 
1977. 
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the commercial banks, and the Fund. Each participant depended on 
the others before a deal could be struck, and all counted on the Fund 
to ask the necessary questions and secure the necessary commitments 
from the countries in distress. Among the many documents, the criti-
cal one was an IMF stand-by granted on the basis of a Letter of Intent. 
Though, technically the commitment was only to the IMF, and the 
Fund always maintained that stand-by arrangements are not interna-
tional agreementsP in fact, the commitment extended to the entire 
international financial community. Funds were to be made available 
periodically, and if the IMF turned off its tap, it was very likely that the 
other participants would do so as well, as indeed happened more than 
once. 
Amid various rumors of a sell-out, the Government of Mexico 
made its Letter of Intent public promptly, as the British government 
had done fifteen years earlier, but it did not attach a Technical 
Memorandum of Understanding, which also became public, and of 
course contributed to the perception, as Mexico's newspapers 
claimed, that the IMF ran Mexico even according to the calendar. 
I do not share the accusation of "sell-out" or surrender. And in-
deed a good case can be made that what the international community 
demanded, with the IMF out front, came within "macroeconomic 
variables," and thus within the jurisdiction barrier that we started 
with. But it was at least a way station, recall my title Erosion . . . , not 
sudden collapse. The Fund had sought to reduce Mexico's budget 
deficit from 17% of GDP to 6. 7%; the government sought to hold out 
for 10%; the final target figures in the Letter of Intent were 8.5% for 
1983, 5.5% for 1984, and 3.5% for 1985. Public sector external debt 
was to rise by no more than $5 billion in 1983, compared to $19 bil-
lion in 1981 and some $6 billion in the first half of 1982. The Letter 
of Intent contained a murky paragraph about "protecting the stan-
dard of living of the popular classes"; the IMF's own press release 
spoke of a reduction in inflation from 90-100% in 1982 to about 55% 
in succeeding years, and said "incomes policy," i.e., the opposite of 
wages keeping pace with rise in prices, was "of central importance in 
the adjustment program. "18 
The issue of incomes policy became even more critical with Bra-
zil, which was just emerging from two decades of military rule, and 
17 See jOSEPH GOLD, STAND BY ARRANGEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND 44-45 (1970). 
18 IMF Press Release No. 82/72 (Dec. 23, 1982), reprinted in 12 IMF SuRVEY, jan. 1983, 
at 1. 
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had held its first election since 1964-for the Chamber of Deputies 
and state governors, not yet for the presidency-in November, 1982, 
just before its cash ran out. Brazil first received a rescue package to 
prevent default, then a massive credit and postponement of maturities 
of existing credits built around a Letter of Intent to the Fund, includ-
ing quarterly performance targets linked, at least by implication, to 
phased disbursements from the Fund and the other lenders. 
Was the IMF really prepared to enforce the link, that is to cut off 
disbursements if Brazil did not comply with the performance targets? 
The key was inflation, which the government had promised to reduce 
from 100% in 1982 to 80% in 1983, 40% in 1984 and so on-to be 
accomplished by interrupting the cycle of wage increases reflected in, 
and at least partly caused by the practice of indexing practically every-
thing, that is, making wages, interest rates, tax rates, and currency 
values move in parallel. The government was reluctant to force visible 
give backs by the population, and in fact did not meet its targets for 
the first quarter of 1983. What to do? Should the Fund actually turn 
off the tap, with the other lenders likely to fall in line? 
The Fund was reluctant. It sought-properly-for a solution that 
could both maintain the credibility of conditionality and keep Brazil 
in compliance, rather than in default. Not incidentally, if Brazil actu-
ally defaulted, that would have a devastating effect on the balance 
sheet of the major money-center banks. The Fund decided to send 
another mission, with a view to renegotiating the Letter oflntent. 
The negotiations-! am compressing a little-involved a decree-
law to be issued by the President limiting wage increases to 80% of 
price increases, with some relaxation by the Fund of the targets for 
reduction of the public sector deficit. But under the newly revived 
Brazilian Constitution, a decree-law could remain in effect only for 
sixty days without approval of the Congress, and when Congress 
voted, the decree-law lost. With the revised financial package not yet 
signed in Washington, President Figuereido issued another decree-
law, still designed to meet the IMF's demand to reduce the inflation 
rate to 80%, but with the lowest paid workers, roughly two-thirds of 
the work force, retaining their right to increases equal to 100% of the 
inflation rate. Subsequently the President issued still another decree, 
and after an all-night session including a seven-hour filibuster, the 
Chamber of Deputies approved by 245 to 3, with 231 members ab-
staining. Eventually a $6.5 billion credit package that had been tenta-
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tively announced in September was signed in January, 1984, with 550 
banks participating.I9 
I tell this story not to bring up details almost twenty years old, but 
to point out that when democracy itself hangs in the balance, the fo-
cus on "macroeconomic variables" cannot be the whole story, for the 
IMF or for the international financial community as a whole. 
I want to move on to the Southeast Asia Financial Crisis, but I 
think a brief stop is justified for the second Mexican peso crisis in the 
winter of 1994-95. Within a few days of the collapse of the peso, the 
Clinton Administration came forward with a big rescue plan, with 
loan guarantees up to $40 billion, on the strength of which-plus the 
usual commitments-the IMF agreed to the then largest credit in its 
history, about$7.8 billion or 300% ofMexico's quota in the Fund. But 
then the U.S. Congress balked, and the Clinton Administration im-
provised a second package, drawing on the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund which, assuming it was legal, did not require the approval of 
Congress.2° To justify its action, the U.S. government insisted, and 
Mexico agreed, to a comprehensive detailed financial plan, in part 
restating the commitments made to the IMF, but with default and ac-
celeration clauses straight out of the form book for commercial bank 
loans, complete with forum selection clauses-the Southern District 
of New York-New York choice of law, waiver of immunity, and so on. 
More than that, Mexico agreed, not in 1895 but in 1995, that all re-
ceipts from the sale of oil by PEMEX, the state-owned oil company, 
would be deposited in a special account maintained by the Banco de 
Mexico at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. As such deposits 
were received by the New York Fed, Banco de Mexico was to credit a 
corresponding amount on its books to PEMEX, but the funds re-
mained in New York, and the New York Fed was authorized and in-
structed by the Banco de Mexico to use the funds to repay the U.S. 
19 See Kenneth N. Gilpin, Brazil Gets $6.5 Billion in New Loans, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1984, 
at39. 
2° The Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) was established pursuant to section 10 of 
the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, codified and amended as 31 U.S.C. § 5302. Though the 
purpose of the ESF had no relation to crises in foreign countries, the General Counsel of 
the Deparunent of the Treasury pointed out in a formal opinion that Congress had, at 
several times, rejected proposals to limit the President's authority under the Act, and ar-
gued that, "[t]he highly technical and complex area of foreign exchange and exchange 
market stability blends important considerations of monetary and foreign policy ... an 
area that is properly left to the discretion of the President." Letter from Edward S. Knight, 
General Counsel, to Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury (Feb. 21, 1995) (on file 
with author). 
2002] The Erosion of Sovereignty 267 
Treasury all amounts due and payable under the Financing Agree-
ments. 
In any event, those security arrangements did not have to be 
used, as Mexico drew less than was authorized under the U.S. plan 
and repaid the full amount by the end of 1996. President Zedillo 
stated in a speech in Mexico City: 
Some predicted that our country would collapse, that the 
foreign aid would be unpayable and infringe our sover-
eignty, and that in the short term we'd be in a worse crisis. 
But the early retirement of the debt to the United States 
Treasury demonstrates the coherence and responsibility the 
Mexican people and Government have shown in these tough 
times.21 
IV. 
Hardly had Mexico calmed down when the Southeast Asia crisis 
flared up in the summer of 1997. It is still not clear, and may never be, 
what combination of factors caused the crisis, which started in Thai-
land and spread with surprising speed to the Philippines, South Ko-
rea, Indonesia, and elsewhere in the region. What seemed to be dif-
ferent this time, however, was the absence of macroeconomic 
imbalance. In contrast to Mexico, Brazil, and other states of Latin 
America, the countries of Southeast Asia had experienced low budget 
deficits, relatively low public debt, inflation in single digits, rapid eco-
nomic growth, and high savings and investment rates. If these indica-
tors looked healthy, what could have caused the sudden capital flight, 
sharp drop in currency values, bankruptcy, and massive layoffs? The 
answer, as it seemed to the IMF and other outsiders, must have been 
in internal management. 
For the first time in the IMF dialogues, one hears of nepotism, 
corruption, and the need on the one hand for more regulation of 
weak banking systems, and on the other hand for deregulation of 
economic sectors with sheltered inefficient monopolies. "Crony Capi-
talism" entered the vocabulary. The chaebols in Korea-that is large 
conglomerates with cross-holdings linking banking, steel, automo-
biles, and electronics-which had once been looked up to as propel-
ling Korea almost into the first world (it had become the eleventh 
2! See David E. Sanger, Mexico &pays Bailout by U.S. Ahead of Time, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
1997, at AI. 
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largest economy in the world) were now seen as a major cause of col-
lapse. 
There were, of course, other factors of the kind the IMF and the 
G-10 countries lining up with it were more familiar with. For instance, 
as the Japanese economy stagnated and the yen lost value in relation 
to the dollar, economies whose currencies were tied to the dollar 
found it harder to compete with Japan in export markets. Certainly 
the IMF did not forget all that it had learned over half a century, or 
totally discard its form books. But there was a new approach, as com-
mitments of a different kind were now required from the applicant 
countries. I focus here on Korea-which is interesting also because 
there was an election in the middle of the negotiations with the 
Fund-but the same point could be made with respect to Thailand, 
Indonesia, or the Philippines. The Fund, prodded by the United 
States, was looking closely at the private sector, and securing commit-
ments related specifically to private activity. For instance, the deal with 
Korea was held up for ten hours in its final stages before the Korean 
government agreed to require GAAP-generally accepted accounting 
practices, American style.22 Korea also agreed for the first time to ac-
quisitions by foreign companies of Korean companies, not hostile 
take-overs but friendly mergers, and it agreed to permit companies to 
lay off workers, which had previously been close to impossible. 
A few excerpts from Korea's ten-page Letter of Intent to the IMF 
of February 7, 1998, will serve to illustrate the new limits, or rather 
lack of limits, of international concern.23 In addition to commitment 
to targets concerning such macroeconomic indicators as growth in 
Gross Domestic Product and increase in usable foreign exchange re-
serves, the government now undertook to issue regulations on: 
-mark to market accounting for all financial institutions; 
-loan classification criteria; and 
22 See Richard W. Stevenson & Jeff Gerth, LM.F. 's New Look: A Far Deeper Role in Lands in 
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,1997, atAl. 
23 In accordance with the IMF's new policy of encouraging member states to make 
their Letters of Intent and associated documents public, Korea's Letter of Intent and six 
accompanying Memoranda on Economic Program, 1998 appear on the IMF Web Site. 
Letter of Intent from the Government of the Republic of Korea to Michel Camdessus, 
Managing Director of IMF (Feb. 7, 1998), at http:/ /www.imf.org/external/np/loi/ 
020798.htm. A footnote to the Memorandum on Macroeconomic Policies states, "[I]t is 
the government's intention to seek approval of the National Assembly for the measures 
that require the enactment or amendment of laws." Id. Footnotes to two other Memoranda 
state the details of the measures there outlined will be included in the World Bank Struc-
tural Adjustment Loan negotiated at the same time. !d. 
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-external audits of specialized and development banks by 
internationally recognized accounting firms. 
And about a dozen similar subjects related to management of the in-
ternal financial market. Further, the government undertook (where 
necessary by legislative amendment) to: 
-clarify the circumstances and procedures for layoffs; 
-relax restrictive legal provisions relating to private job 
placement and manpower leasing services; 
-triple budgetary resources for an employment insurance 
fund, including more training support and employment 
stabilization; and 
--expand unemployment benefits to cover firms with more 
than ten employees (in contrast to the previous minimum 
of thirty employees), and to increase the minimum benefit 
level to seventy percent (from the prior level of fifty per-
cent) of the minimum wage; 
and so on. 
Corporate governance became a major subject of discussion, and 
commitment. Korea also committed to requiring: 
-financial statements of listed companies to be prepared 
and audited in accordance with international standards; 
-publication of combined financial statements for associ-
ated companies; 
-reduction in use of mutual guarantees by corporate 
affiliates and subsidiaries; 
-at least one outside director for companies listed on the 
Korea Stock Exchange; 
-strengthened rights of minority shareholders; and 
-believe it or not, reviewing the possibility of allowing for 
class action suits against corporate executives and auditors. 
One would expect the Fund to call for trade liberalization, and 
phasing out trade-related subsidies, linked to commitments under the 
rules of the World Trade Organization. But Korea now undertook as 
well a series of commitments on foreign direct and portfolio invest-
ment: 
-foreign banks and brokerage houses were to be permitted 
to establish subsidiaries in Korea; 
-ceilings on foreign investment in Korean equities were to 
be eliminated; and 
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-transparent guidelines would govern foreign investment in 
domestic financial institutions. 
Each of these commitments carried a target date in calendar year 
1998. In March, 1999 Korea and the IMF negotiated a further Letter 
of Intent covering many of the same subjects plus details on privatiza-
tion of specified state-owned enterprises, regulation of insurance 
companies, and restructuring of chaebols. 24 
Most of the reforms appear sound to an outside observer. I don't 
even want to make the point that they seem to impose (if that is the 
right word) Western and largely American practices. My point here is 
only that the boundary between international and internal concern 
seems to have largely disappeared. 
v. 
Some critics here and abroad thought the new IMF was over-
stepping its bounds. Professor Feldstein, for example, wrote that the 
legitimate political institutions of the country, not the Fund, should 
determine the nation's economic structure. "A nation's desperate 
need for short-term financial help does not give the IMF the moral 
right to substitute its technical judgments for the outcome of the na-
tion's political process. "25 
Feldstein, being an economist, spoke of a "moral right." As law-
yers, we see the question perhaps more in terms of jurisdiction and 
standing, and ultimately of sovereignty. Feldstein proposed three 
questions: 
(1) Is this reform really needed to restore the country's ac-
cess to international capital markets? 
(2) Is this a technical matter that does not interfere unneces-
sarily with the proper jurisdiction of a sovereign govern-
ment? 
(3) If the policies to be changed are also practiced in the ma-
jor industrial economies of Europe, would the IMF think 
it appropriate to force similar changes in those countries 
if they were subject to a Fund program? 
24 For more information, see Letter of Intent from the Government of the Republic of 
Korea to Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of IMF (Mar. 10, 1999), at http://www. 
imf.org/external/np/loi/1999/031099. Similar Letters of Intent were negotiated with 
Thailand and Indonesia, differing in detail but not in the scope of the subjects covered. 
25 Martin Feldstein, Refocusing the IMF, 78 FoREIGN. AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 20, 27. 
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The Fund's management saw no reason to hide the change in ap-
proach. 
Michel Camdessus, the Managing Director said, "[t]he center-
piece of each program is not a set of austerity measures to restore 
macroeconomic balance, but a set of forceful, far-reaching structural 
reforms, to strengthen financial systems, increase transparency, open 
markets, and in so doing, restore market confidence."26 
Stanley Fischer, the Deputy Managing Director, answered Feld-
stein directly: 
To question 1, is this reform really necessary, the answer in the Asian 
programs is yes. 
To question 2, is this a technical matter that does not interfere unneces-
sarily with the proper jurisdiction of a sovereign government, the answer is 
complicated-yes, for instance, banking sector reform is a highly 
technical issue-far more than the size of the budget deficit. But why 
is this more of an intrusion into sovereign government than trade lib-
eralization, which has long been a part of IMF and World Bank pro-
grams. 
To question 3, Would the IMF ask the European countries to make simi-
lar changes if they had a Fund program-absolutely. 27 
Finally, Fischer said, Feldstein omitted the most important ques-
tion: Does this program address the underlying causes of the crisis? 
CONCLUSION 
Three years later, I think the justification for the Fund's "struc-
tural reforms" in terms of success can be found in Korea. The rather 
different outcome in Indonesia suggests that if success is the 
justification for breaching the jurisdictional barrier with which we 
started-more than fifty years ago-the answer is not so clear. One 
could look to other illustrations-at Russia, for instance, or at some of 
the African countries applying or refraining from applying for debt 
relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries or the Poverty Re-
duction and Growth Initiatives.28 Some have been successful, some 
not, and in some cases it is hard to tell. 
26 Michel Camdessus, Address at the Council on Foreign Relations (Feb. 6, 1998), 27 
IMF SURVEY, Feb., 1998, at 49, 50, available at http:/ /www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/ 
1998/020698.htm. 
27 Stanley Fischer, Address at U .C.L.A., The IMF and the Asian Crisis (Mar. 20, 1998), at 
http:/ /www.imf.org/ external/ np I speeches/ 1998/032098.htm. 
28 SeeiMF ANN. REP. 2001, at 47-57. 
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I have not come to pass judgment. My purpose has been merely 
to point out that what Professor Lichtenstein and I learned in law 
school about the boundaries between states and the international 
community-part law, part history, part political theory-is in several 
respects obsolete, at least for those countries that need the IMF, the 
World Bank, and related agencies. It is also obsolete for those agen-
cies themselves, though the replacement, that is a new combination of 
authorities and restraints, remains inarticulate. Once again, the facts 
on the ground have outrun the theoretical concepts. 
